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THE SLEEPING GIANT OF RIGHTS:
SECTION 7 AND SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW
KATHLEEN MCMANUSt

Section 7 of the Charter has given the courts the powerful tool of substantive
review. This instrument allows the courts to go beyond procedural review to
examine the merits of legislation. This ability to intrude on what has been
regarded as the exclusive jurisdiction of legislatures has attracted powerful
critics. The courts have ignored some opponents and have used substantive
reviews. The steps have been tentative but important. If the courts continue
to use and indeed broaden substantive review, then section 7 will be the
source of new rights which will enable Canada to become a society of truly
meaningful equality.

L 'article 7 de la Charte procure aux cours de justice un puissant instrument
en matiere de revision substantielle. Celui-ci permet non seulement de reviser
!'aspect procedural de la legislation, mais egalement de reviser le merite de
celle-ci. Cette capacite de participer dans ce que !'on considere comme le
domaine exclusif de la branche legislative fut critiquee vivement. Les cours de
justice ont toutefais ignore ces opposants et utilise la revision substantielle. Les
developpements ont he timide mais neanmoins important. Si !es cours
continuent a utiliser et a augmenter la portee de la revision substantielle,
!'article 7 deviendra le fandement de nouveaux droits qui permettront au
Canada de devenir ime societe egalitaire veritable.

t B.S.c., B.A. (Dalhousie), Ph.D.

(L.S.E), LL.B. anticipated 1995 (Dalhousie).
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The British North America Act planted in Canada a living
tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural
limits.
Lord Sankey, Edwardsv. A.G. Canada 1
An explosion of new rights within the Charter 2 will eventually occur in Canada. Canadians will see, at some point, a Supreme Court
of Canada cast in the mold of interventionist courts such as the
United States' Burger and Warren Courts or even some variation on
the Lochner era. A Supreme Court of Canada with such dynamics
will push aside deference to Parliament and provincial legislatures
and challenge the merits of government action. When this confrontation occurs, hopefully it will be a progressive Court whose actions broaden the base of rights protected by the Charter. In this
expansion of rights, it will be critical that the Court recognizes the
rights of groups who to date have been left out of the Canadian experience, such as the poor or various cultural minorities.
Section 7 of the Charter will most likely be the source for this
burst of new rights. Section 7 guarantees that:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the
person and the right not be deprived thereof except in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice
[emphasis added].

It will be in defining "fundamental justice" that the Court will have
the ability to question and reject the policy of government action as
contrary to protected rights. This examination of the purpose or
merits of the legislation is known as substantive review. Conversely,
when the court restricts its examination to the implementation or
the means of the legislation, then the court is conducting a procedural review. A court which engages in substantive reviews tends to
be highly interventionist in government policy, as seen with the
United States Supreme Court during various periods of its history.3
1

Edwardsv. A.G. Canada, [1930] A.C. 124 at 136.
Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the CanandaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
3 The United States Supreme Court use of substantive review exists in case law
from the 1870s to the 1970s. The most famous use in recent times is Roev. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 3 5 L. Ed. (2d) 147 (1973), when the Court struck down a
prohibition on abortions. In terms of specific eras, the Court's intervention was
2
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In 1985, the Supreme Court of Canada opened the door for
substantive review through its decision in Reference re Section 94(2)
of the B. C. Motor Vehicle Act R.S.B. C. 4 The Court held that fundamental justice, as defined in section 7, included both procedural
and substantive review. Following this ruling, the courts mainly have
shied away from utilising substantive reviews and have chosen, for
the most part to restrict themselves to procedural review. Their
discomfort with substantive review is evident in examining the cases
on section 7.
As of March 1993, over one thousand cases on section 7 have
been heard in Canada. The Ontarian courts have dealt with the
largest number of section 7 challenges.5 The Supreme Court of
Canada has engaged in a significant substantive review in only five
of these cases. 6 The courts' limited use of substantive review has not
initiated supporters of this type of review to demand more; indeed
felt most keenly during the Lochner era from 1905 to 1930. During these three
decades, the Court rejected the attempts of government to regulate industry. The
Court used substantive review to defend laissez-faire economics. The Lochner era
is so named for the first case in 1905 which commenced the interventionist role
of the Court. In Lochnerv. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), legislation prescribing
maximum hours of work in bakeries was nullified. This trend of intervention
continued as the Court nullified: minimum wages for women, Adkins v.
Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); and, fixing the weight of loaves of
bread, jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924). See: Ferguson v. Skrupa,
372 U.S. 726 (1963) which listed examples of laws nullified through the due
process clause; and, T. C. Marks, Jr., and M. Greenwood, "The Burger Court and
Substantive Rights, An Analytical Approach" (1980) 57 J. Urban Law 751.
4 Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act R.S.B. C. 1979, c. 288, as
amended by the Motor Vehicle Amendment Act 1982, 1982 (B.C.), c. 36., [1985] 2
S.C.R. 486 [hereinafter B. C. Motor Vehicle].
5 These statistics are drawn from the Quicklaw database "Charter of Rights
cases" (CRC). The CRC database is a summary of Charter decisions which have
been compiled since 1982 at the University of Alberta. These statistics are up to
date as of 31 March 1993. Charter litigation is more dominant in some
provinces than others and this statistic is not solely on a population basis. Ontario
litigated 235 section 7 challenges which represented almost 25% of all the cases.
British Columbia came second with 157 cases or 15% of the cases. Saskatchewan
came third with 103 cases or 10% of the cases. These three provinces were
responsible for almost 50% of all section 7 challenges. See Appendix III.
6 B. C. Motor Vehicle, supra at note 4; Singh v. Minister of Employment and
Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 [hereinafter Singh]; R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1
S.C.R. 30 [hereinafter Morgentaler]; R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636
[hereinafter Vaillancourt]; and, R. v. Martineau, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 [hereinafter
Martineau].
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this development, however nascent, has drawn the attention of
critics. The critical response has been forceful, articulate and persuasive in arguing for a narrow form of substantive review. Without
vocal supporters for substantive review, the critics have set the
agenda for issues surrounding substantive review.
The study that follows seeks to gauge the future scope of substantive review. This end will be reached by examining: the history
of the drafting of section 7, the meaning of substantive review already given in case law, an assessment of the critics interpretative
theory, and, a prediction of future decisions. It will be seen that the
youth of the Charter means that much more must be done before a
meaningful conclusion can be drawn. Substantive review remains an
open question. In keeping with the liberal interpretation of the
Charter which the Supreme Court advocates,7 the potential of substantive review appears to lie more in an expansive interpretation,
and as such it lends itself to being a source of new rights.
THE DRAFTING HISTORY OF SECTION 7

The Charter went through seven different versions before being finalized. 8 Remarkably, section 7 was rewritten only once, but the
changes made were dramatic. Section Ts original version 9 provided
that:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except by
due proccess oflaw [emphasis added]. IO

During hearings in January 1981, the Special Joint Committee of
the Senate and House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada
replaced due process with fundamental justice.II The Committee
executed this change with minimal considerations.
7

R. v. BigM Drug Mart Ltd, [1985] 1S.C.R.295.

The dates of the various drafts are: 22 August 1980; 5 October 1980; 12
January 1981; 13 February 1981; 24 April 1981; 18 November 1981 and 2
December 1981. See R. Elliot, "Interpreting the Charter-Use of Earlier
Versions As An Aid" [1982] U.B.C. L. Rev. 11 Charter Ed. 13at13-16.
9 In the first draft, section 7 was actually numbered as section 6. Ibid at 30.
10 Ibid
I I Minutes of the Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee of
the Senate and House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada, No. 40, 27
8
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It is often said that the most important time of a meeting is the
final minutes. It is during this period that substantial change is proposed and often adopted. This general maxim is applicable to
changes in section 7. In January 1981, the Special Joint Committee
devoted three days to the examination of section 7. The debate was
devoted almost exclusively to whether "enjoyment of property"
should be included among the rights enumerated. The language of
due process was scrutinized and changed only in the last hour of the
debate. 12
Changes in section 7 were primarily done at the instigation of
the federal Department of Justice. Several lawyers from the
Department of Justice argued the necessity of limiting section 7 to
procedural review. It was the presentation by Mr. Barry Strayer, the
Assistant Deputy Minister of Public Law in the Department of
Justice, which seemed to persuade the Committee.
Speaking for the Department of Justice, Mr. Strayer told the
Committee:
[l]t is our belief that the words 'fundamental justice'
would cover the same thing as what is called procedural
due process, that is the meaning of due process in relation
to requiring fair procedure. However, it in our view does
not cover the concept of what is called substantive due
process, which would impose substantive requirements as
to the policy of the law in question .... 13
Mr. Svend Robinson, M.P. suggested that fundamental justice
might have a component of substantive review as well as procedural
review. Mr. Fred Jordan, Senior Counsel, Public Law, Department
ofJustice rebuked this suggestion. Mr. Jordan maintained that there
was no distinction between the principles of fundamental justice and
the rules of natural justice. 14 During an exchange with The
Honourable David Crombie, M.P., Mr. Strayer supported Mr.
Jordan's assertions.

Mr. Crombie: Natural justice and fundamental justice do
not deal with substantive matters, only procedural fairJanuary 1981. See also J. D. Whyte, "Fundamental Justice: The Scope and
Application of Section 7 of the Charter' (1983) 13 Man. L.J. 455 at 457-462.
12 Ibid at 458.
l3 Minutes of Proceedings, supra note 11 at 46:32. See also Whyte, ibid at 458.
14 Minutes of Proceedings, ibid. at 46:33. See also Whyte, ibid. at 458.

40

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

ness, that is the difference between those two and due
process?
Mr. Strayer: Yes. 15
Testimony given at the proceedings suggests that the firm belief
regarding the meaning of fundamental justice came from the courts'
interpretations in the Canadian Bill of Rights. 16 The phrase
"fundamental justice" is found in section 2(e) of this Act. Section
2(e) provides that no law of Canada shall:
(e) deprive a person of the right to a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice for the
determination of his rights and obligations [emphasis
added].
The Committee's attention was drawn to the ruling by Fateux, C.J.
in Duke v. The Queen 17 on section 2(e). Fateux, C.J. held that the
section required that a
tribunal which adjudicates upon [a person's] rights must
act fairly, in good faith, without bias and in a judicial
temper, and must give to him the opportunity adequately
to state his case. 18
Fundamental justice, in other words, meant in accordance with the
laws of natural justice.
The context of the Charter presented at least one difficulty in
transposing the meaning of fundamental justice as found in Canadian
Bill of Rights to the Charter. Section 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of
Rights supplied context to its principles of fundamental justice
through specific language such as "fair hearing." Similar language
did not exist in section 7. This issue of differing contexts did not
come up at the Committee's hearing. The Committee accepted the
testimony and accordingly removed due process and inserted
fundamental justice. With this adjustment, section 7 was now in its
final form.
The Committee's desires cannot be denied. It wanted only procedural review in section 7 and the lawyers from the Department of
Justice appeared to provide the means. In retrospect, it remains re15

Ibid at 46:42.
R.S.C. 1985, Appendix III.
17 Dukev. The Queen, [1972] S.C.R. 917.
18 Ibid. at 923.

16
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grettable that if the Committee knew what it wished that it had not
sought more advice. This wisdom comes with hindsight. History
offers many examples of monumental political decisions occurring
rapidly and with minimal scrutiny. These examples, however
prevalent in history, do not soften the shattering blow of the haste
with which the Committee disposed of this matter. This haste exacted its cost in B.C. Motor Vehicle. 19

ESTABLISHING A VIOLATION OF SECTION

7

B. C. Motor Vehicle set out how to come within the meaning of section 7 and the scope of judicial review therein. A three-part test
must be satisfied before the court will find a violation of section
7. 2° First, the plaintiff must show that government action infringes
life or liberty or security to the person. 21 Second, the plaintiff must
show that the violation of her right was not in accordance with
principles of fundamental justice. Third, the onus shifts to the government to show that the infringement is justified pursuant to section 1.
The court will determine whether fundamental justice has been
followed by using the test set out by Lamer, J, as he then was, in

B. C. Motor Vehicle.
All [ss. 7-14] have been recognized ... as essential elements of a system for the administration of justice which
is founded upon the belief in dignity and the worth of the
human person. Consequently, the principles of fundamental justice are to be found in the basic tenets and
principles not only of our judicial process, but also of the
other components of our legal system [emphasis added]. 22
19

Supra note 4.
It is assumed here that the plaintiff has established the involvement of a
government actor, thereby satisfying the threshold of s. 32 of the Charter.
21 The early jurisprudence shows confusion as to whether life, liberty or
security to the person was read as a single right or as three distinct rights.
Marceau, J. of the Federal Court of Appeal in Canada v. Operation Dismantle,
[1983] 1 F.C. 745 at 772-775 held that section 7 protected one right. Wilson, J.,
however, expressed the contrary view in Singh, supra note 6 at 204. Wilson, J.
found three distinct rights in section 7. Her view was confirmed by Lamer, J. in
B.C. Motor Vehicle, supra note 4 at 500 and by Dickson, C.J. in Morgentaler, supra
note 6 at45.
22 B. C. Motor Vehicle, supra note 4 at 512.
20

42

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

This test, Lamer, J. held, includes procedural and substantive reviews.23 This finding rejected the Special Committee's desire to
have only procedural review. Enabling the courts to conduct both
procedural and substantive reviews broadens significantly their
powers; they are no longer restricted to the implementation of
legislation but now can review the purpose of the legislation. The
courts' new breadth of power comes through best in an illustration.
Assume that Nova Scotia's Motor Vehicle Act has a section which
states:
Everyone who drives recklessly is guilty of a summary
offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding two years.
A plaintiff has been charged under this section for driving through a
red light. This plaintiff wants to challenge this section using section
7. The court in a procedural review could strike down the section as
being too vague or overly broad. Under this review, the court does
not address the social policy of keeping reckless drivers off the
road, but determines if the legislative means conform to natural
justice. If, however, the court bases its review on the merits of preventing reckless driving it then would be conducting a substantive
review of the legislation.
Most courts have not taken advantage of the extensive powers of
substantive review. A large part of the court's hesitation no doubt
rests with Lamer, J.'s test of "basic tenets of the legal system,"
which is broad and vague. Lamer, J. acknowledged the imprecise
nature of his test:
Consequently, those words [fundamental justice] cannot
be given any exhaustive content or simple enumerative
definition, but will take on concrete meaning as the courts
address alleged violations. 24
This broad test is perhaps a little too daunting and confusing for
most courts to use in giving meaning to fundamental justice. Even
the Supreme Court of Canada is not immune from confusion. In an
attempt to define the "basic tenets of the legal system," five justices
of the Supreme Court of Canada gave five different opinions in
23
24

Ibid. at 497.
Ibid. at 513.
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Thomson Newspapers v. Canada. 25 It cannot be particularly enticing
to lower courts to apply this test to new areas when clearly the
Supreme Court of Canada appears at a loss as to how it functions.
UNDERSTANDING THE PRE-DOMINANCE
OF PROCEDURAL REVIEW

The courts employ almost exclusively a procedural review because
this form of judicial review has existed long before the Charter was
enacted. Common law, through the principles of natural justice, has
long employed procedural review to ensure a fair hearing. 26 This
review has included protection against the bias of decision-makers,
the ability to defend, and the right to know reasons of the decision.
The language in sections 8-14 of the Charter are in most regards a
codification of the common law principles of natural justice.
Among the specific protection these sections afford are: protection
against search and seizure without authority (s. 8); protection against
arbitrary detention or imprisonment (s. 9); protection against arrest
or detention without knowing the reasons (s. 10); guarantee of habeas
corpus (s. 10); presumption of innocence (s. l l(d)); protection
against cruel and unusual punishment (s. 12); and, protection against
self-incrimination (s. 13). The nature of these sections relate
primarily to arrest and trial procedures, so it is not surprising that
criminal law represents 60% of section 7 challenges. 27
The protections in sections 8-14 are ones whose applications
courts can quickly grasp and thus do use them with ease. When,
therefore, Lamer, J. held that sections 8-14 are "illustrative, but not
exclusively so," 28 of the protection found in fundamental justice, it
is hardly surprising that the courts focussed on the "illustrative" in
using sections 8-14 as interpretative tools of fundamental justice.
The courts' embracing of sections 8-14, as the guide, has resulted in
giving fundamental justice an almost exclusive procedural review
flavour. The second portion in Lamer, J's statement, that funda2 5 Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research,
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission), [1990] I S.C.R. 425.

26

Administrative law, which has become extremely active in the last few
decades, has contributed much to defining and broad application of natural
justice.
27 See Appendix I.
28 B. C Motor Vehicle, supra note 4 at 502-503 per Lamer, J.
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mental principles have meaning beyond sections 8-14, remains
largely uncharted waters for the courts. The scope of substantive
review will rest on how the courts eventually navigate their way in
these new waters.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
OF SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW

The real challenge of defining substantive review within fundamental justice has been, as seen above, avoided by the courts. This being
said, the courts, particularly the Supreme Court of Canada, have not
been completely unwilling to conduct substantive reviews. Since
1985, the Supreme Court of Canada has rendered five key decisions
on substantive review. 29 These five cases divide into two distinct
groups. In two of these case, R. v. Vaillancourt3° and R. v. Martineau,31 the Supreme Court of Canada adopted a front-door
approach to substantive review. The Court rejected Parliament's
policy on categorization of certain types of murder. In the remaining three cases, Singh,3 2 B. C. Motor Vehicles,33 and Morgentaler,34 the
Court took a back-door approach to substantive review. These cases
are accepted as instances in which the Court engaged in procedural
review. The concerns of the Court in these instances, however, were
far more than procedural as the Court was striking down legislative
policy. Elements of substantive review, in varying degrees, are
found in these cases under the guise of procedural review. All five
cases will now be examined briefly in turn.
In Vaillancourt35 and Martineau,36 the Supreme Court of Canada
used substantive review in examining the section in the Criminal
Code on felony-murder (sometimes called the constructive murder
rule)37 and found it violated fundamental justice. The striking down
2 9 The Supreme Court of Canada has considered section 7 on sixty-two
occasions since 1982. Source: Quicklaw database of Supreme Court of Canada.
30 Supra note 6.
31 Supra note 6.
32 Supra note 6.
33 Supra note 4.
34 Supra note 6.
35 Supra note 6.
36 Supra note 6.
37 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 21(2).
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of felony-murder as a type of murder in the Criminal Code
occurred in two stages. The first stage occurred in Vaillancourt. The
accused was charged with a felony-murder. Under the section, an
accused who caused death while involved in certain serious offences,
such as robbery, while armed with a weapon, was guilty of murder.
This section required no mens rea for murder, only the proof of the
felony. The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that the
felony-murder provision was unconstitutional because it lacked a
mens rea requirement for murder. It was held that the extreme
stigma of murder and the severe punishment involved meant some
form of mens rea was required to satisfy fundamental justice. The
Court left unanswered whether the mens rea should be objective or
subjective. The Martineau decision answered this question. The
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held subjective mens rea
was required. This ruling struck down felony-murder as a type of
murder. The Supreme Court of Canada in direct opposition to the
policy of the Parliament struck down felony-murder as a type of
murder. L'Heureux-Dube, J., in dissent, wrote that the setting of
policy as to which acts constituted murder was a policy of
Parliament not to be interfered with by the courts. She wrote further
of the contradictions she found in the majority's decision.
Principles of fundamental justice were supposed to be found in the
basic tenets of the legal system. L'Heureux-Dube, J. could find no
other system based on inherited English principles of criminal law
that set subjective foresight as the exclusive standard of murder.
L'Heureux-Dube, J.'s observations show just how far the Supreme
Court of Canada was prepared to reach into policy matters.
The Supreme Court of Canada's willingness to explore the
merits of policy is not always done in a forthcoming manner. A
back-door approach was taken in the next three cases.
The first of the these three cases on substantive review under the
guise of procedural review is Singh. 38 This case is not only the earliest decision, but also the one where the focus was most firmly on
procedural review. Within the Court's decision, however, are elements of substantive review. The presence of substantive review is
subtle. In the successive cases of B. C. Motor Vehicle and
Morgentaler, however, substantive review transforms itself into a
dominant voice.

38

Supra note 6.
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Singh involved a challenge to the Immigration Act 3 9 and the
procedures followed in determining refugee status. Refugee status
was determined by the Minister upon the recommendation by the
Refugee Status Advisory Committee. An appeal of the Minister's
decision could be made in writing to the Immigration Appeal
Board. All six justices who participated in the judgment found the
appeal process inadequate. They held that any illegal immigrant
claiming refugee status had the right to appear before the Appeal
Board. The justices differed in giving legal support to this finding.
Three justices based their findings on section 2(e) of the Canadian
Bill of Rights. 40 Writing on behalf of the remaining justices, Wilson,
J. found the lack of appeal in the procedures violated fundamental
justice.
The argument can be made that Wilson, J.'s review was solely
procedural in nature as she addressed the requirements of a fair
hearing. Traces of a substantive review of the procedures, can, however, be found in her decision. The Canadian Government made
representations that these procedures were a policy choice made on
the need for an efficient system and monetary constraints. Wilson, J.
rejected these arguments as inadmissable. In effect, then, Wilson, J.
told the federal government what institutional structure was required whether it could be afforded or not. It could be argued that
Wislon, J.'s review, while broader than traditional procedural reviews, illustrates that procedural matters can have significant, and
substantial effects. Moreover, though the Court may have adopted
an activist's position, in some regards, it was all done within the
ambit of procedural review. Perhaps procedural review has come to
intrude on policy. This development, however, is a change.
Although procedural matters largely precipatated this change, the
subtle presence of substantive issues cannot be overlooked.
The next case which incorporates a substantive element in the
procedural review was B. C. Motor Vehicle. 41 This case involved a
challenge of a section in the British Columbia Motor Vehicle Act. 42
This section made it an offence to drive while prohibited or while
1976, s.c. 1976-77, c. 52.
Supra note 16.
41 Supra note 4.
42 R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 288, as am. by the Motor Vehicle Amendment Act 1982, S.B.C.
1982, c. 36.
39

40
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under suspension and set a minimum penalty of imprisonment. The
Supreme Court found the section created an absolute liability
against person who may or may not know of the prohibition or suspension. This lack of culpability coupled with a prison term was
found to violate fundamental justice. The Supreme Court's action
seems, at first, to be a procedural review. The decision, it could be
argued, was concerned with the implementation of the legislation,
not its merits. The Supreme Court did not, after all, say the
legislature could not in certain circumstances ban driving. A strong
presence of substantive review is found, however, in this decision; the
Supreme Court interfered with a policy choice of the legislature regarding sanctions. The legislature exercised a choice in dealing
with a social issue and the Court rejected its choice.
Morgentaler4 3 is the most dramatic example of the Supreme
Court broadening the definition of procedural review in order to
review the substantive part of legislation. This case involved a challenge to a section in the Criminal Cod& 4 which made abortions illegal unless performed in an accredited hospital with the approval
of the hospital's therapeutic abortion committee. The hospital
committee could only approve an abortion to preserve the life or
health of the woman. Parliament's goal was to limit the circumstances in which women could have abortions. The majority of the
Court found that this section violated the principles of fundamental
justice. Wilson, J., however, was alone in striking down the section
on substantive grounds. She held the restrictions on abortions were
unconstitutional. The remainder of the majority justices were less
forthcoming. They found a violation of fundamental principles officially on procedural grounds. They held that the procedures of the
therapeutic abortion committee could delay or deny an abortion. If
these justices had restricted their comments to how the committee
conducted itself, then perhaps it could pass as a genuine procedural
review; however, they took objection with Parliament's overall
scheme to restrict abortions. It is this broader rejection of the
Parliamentary scheme which moved the Court into striking down
policy and therefore striking down legislation on substantive
grounds.
In all of the above cases, the Supreme Court of Canada reviewed legislation on its merits in varying degrees. The Court's in43
44

Supra note 6.
R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 251.
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trusions into the legislature's policy powers were not severe, but
they were sufficient enough to suggest how future ventures into
policy could be far bolder as the judiciary gives fuller meaning to
substantive review. It is this very potential for fuller review which
has brought out the critics of broad substantive review.
CRITICS OF SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW

Critics against a broad substantive review within fundamental justice have many well-respected legal writers in their ranks as Peter
Hogg, J. M. Evans, and Eric Colvin. Concern arose because of the
Supreme Court of Canada's decision in B. C. Motor Vehicle.45
Decisions such as Morgentalel' 6 have heightened these apprehensions.
The prevalent anxiety about substantive review is that the judiciary
will review the social and economic policies in government action;
such broad review would mean the end of deference to the
legislature. These concerns are based on the actions of the Supreme
Court of the United States during various periods of time, but none
more so than the Lochner era, 1905-1937.
The Lochner era in the United States is so named for the first
decision which set the pattern of decisions for the next three
decades. In Lochner v. New York, 47 the Supreme Court of the
United States used substantive due process to strike down a law that
limited the hours of work in bakeries. Over the course of the next
thirty years, the Court applied substantive due process to strike
down state and federal laws that set maximum hours of work,
minimum wages, health and safety, standards and protection of
union activity. 48 In 1937, these decisions were overruled, but the
Supreme Court's disregard for government policy left a lingering
concern about the power of courts with substantive review authority.
It was this worry that motivated the replacement of due process
with fundamental justice in section 7. 49

45
46

Supra note 4.
Supra note 6.

(1905) 198 U.S. 45.
Supra note 3 for a full discussion of this era. See also: J.E. Nowak and R. D.
Rotunda, Constitutional Law, 4th ed. (St. Paul: West Pub., 1991) at 351-451.
49 Supra note 8 at 4-9 for the history of the drafting of section 7.
47
48
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Critics of substantive review want to ensure no Canadian equivalent of the Lochner era occurs. 50 Only Eric Colvin, however, has put
forward a theory as to how substantive review must be interpreted to
prevent a Canadian Lochner era.5 1 His theory has found support
among such respected legal scholars as Peter Hogg,5 2 and it is a
theory that must be addressed.
Colvin' s underlying thesis is that:
Section 7 is concerned with legal means rather than social
ends, with justice of processes by which social objectives
are pursued rather than with the justice of the ends which
are sought. 53
Or stated more bluntly, Colvin holds there is
no support for the broad view that section 7 permits judicial review of the substantive content of law in a sense
which would cover the social objectives which law embodies.54
Colvin achieves a restrictive substantive review by arguing that
section 7 can only be interpreted in light of sections 8-14. The
courts cannot for the purposes of analyzing section 7 import from
any other sections of the Charter beyond those of sections 8-14. The
reason given for this restriction is that fundamental justice in section
7 covers only legal rights. This limitation is made by the structure
of the Charter; sections 7-14 are placed together under the heading
of "Legal Rights." The separate grouping, for Colvin, shows the
drafters' intent to isolate fundamental justice to legal rights or
alternatively stated, to limit it to the means. Inherent in this theory
50 Obsession with the Lochner era is not exclusive to the critics. Most writers on
fundamental justice make reference to this era. See: P. Garant, "Fundamental
Rights and Fundamental Justice" in G. A. Beaudoin and E. Ratushny, eds., The
Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, 2nd ed. (Scarborough: Carswell, 1989);
T. Lee "Section 7 of the Charter: An Overview" (1985) 43 (No.2) U.T. Fae. L.
Rev. 1.
5I E. Colvin, "Section Seven Of The Canadian Charter Of Rights And
Freedoms" (1989) 68 Can. Bar Rev. 560.
52 P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 3rd ed. (Scarborough: Carswell,
1992) at 1034-35. Another supporter of Colvin's views is J.M. Evans "The
Principles of Fundamental Justice: The Constitution and Common Law" (1991)
29 Osgoode Hall L. J. 51.
53 Supra note 51 at 561.
s4 Ibid. at 562.
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of interpretation is that the courts cannot review with respect either
to social or economic interests. Colvin believes that Lamer, J.
supported this approach when he held that sections 8-14 were to be
"illustrative" of fundamental justice.55
It is the Morgenta!er5 6 decision in particular that causes difficulties for Colvin's theory. In Morgenta!er, the Supreme Court of
Canada's review ventured beyond means into the social ends. In
order to keep the Court's action consistent with his interpretative
theory, Colvin resorts to Hart's theory of primary and secondary
rules.57
In Hart's theory, the primary rules of a legal system are the ends
and objectives; these rules set out what a person may or may not do
in the same spirit of non-legal rules such as morality. Conversely,
secondary rules are concerned with means; they prescribe how
various activities are to be conducted to ensure the operation of the
(primary) rule-system. Thus, as Colvin argues, fundamental justice
comes under secondary rules because it is concerned with legal
rights. Separation between the two sets of rules is essential.
Generally speaking, primary rules would not come under judicial
scrutiny, but Colvin notes the exception where primary rules set out
conditions for the secondary rules. Under this exception judicial
review of primary rules is permissable, and for this reason Colvin
finds the Morgenta!er decision to be consistent with his theory.
In Morgenta!er, Colvin writes, only the institutional structure
was altered by the Supreme Court of Canada. The Court attacked
only the defects in the primary rules that set conditions for secondary rules; it did not address social or economic interests.5 8
Colvin's distinction is a fine one; arguably, he has pushed the
boundaries of Hart's theory to the point of essentially contradicting
the theory by merging together primary and secondary rules. The
result is an interpretation theory which fails to account for the
broader implications on social policy found in the Court's
decision.

55 B. C. Motor Vehicle, supra note 4 at 502-503.
Supra note 6.
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1961)
at 78-79, 89-96 as referenced in Colvin, supra note 51 at 577.
58 Colvin, supra note 51at578-579.
56

57
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Colvin' s interpretative doctrine is tenuous in three main ways.
First, his restriction to sections 8-14 as guidance for section 7 are
completely contrary to the purposive approach of the Charter advocated by the Supreme Court of Canada. Also, Colvin emphasises
that Lamer, J. stated sections 8-14 must be illustrative of the principles of fundamental justice. Lamer, J., however, left the future interpretation of section 7 more open. Examining the challenges to
date, it is clear that pressure is being placed on the court to use
Charter sections beyond sections 8-14 in interpreting fundamental
justice. In civil cases, section 7 was argued with sections beyond
sections 8-14 in 34% of the challenges. In criminal cases, other sections were utilised in only 15% of the challenges. A trend exists,
nonetheless, to give section 7 a fuller meaning by going outside
sections 8-14.5 9 Second, even if interpretation was restricted to illustrations from sections 8-14, Colvin concedes that primary and
secondary rules are not isolated from each other. Where he purports
the intrusion into primary rules to be exceptional it could equally
be viewed as the thin wedge opening the way for further substantive
review. This wedge, moreover, has been broadened through such
clear assaults on government social policy as seen in Vaillancourt and
Martineau. Third, Colvin drafted his theory only four years after
B. C. Motor Vehicle. The Court in that period had changed little and
it was quite deferential to the parliamentary tradition. Yet, even
with the outwardly conservative Court amazing advances were made
in substantive review. The trend in the Court is toward a broader
meaning of substantive review. Colvin's interpretative theory
probably will not withstand the test of time. Even Peter Hogg can
only hope that Calvin's link between section 7 and sections 8-14,
"however implausible for other interpretative purposes, may help to
shield social and economic legislation from judicial review under
section 7." 60 In the end, though, Hogg concludes the extent of
substantive review remains an unanswered question. 61

59 Although both criminal and civil are using sections beyond those under
Legal Rights, sections 8-14 continue to dominate in defining fundamental
justice. Sections 8-14 were used in conjunction with section 7 the majority of the
times in criminal (65%) and civil (46%). Section 7 also is gaining sufficient
meaning to stand on its on. In both criminal and civil section 7 was used on its
own in 20% of the challenges. See Appendices II and IV.
60 Hogg, supra note 52 at 1035.
61

Ibid.
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THE FUTURE OF SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW

Supporters of narrow substantive review are losing the battle. As
seen in Morgentaler, the Supreme Court of Canada engaged in
broad substantive review and likely will continue to do so. The
question which remains unanswered, though, is how broadly the
Court will apply substantive review to legislation.
Predicting how the Supreme Court will shape substantive review
is difficult. The short supply of case law makes this hard to
forecast. One indicator may be the Lochner era, but realistically
this judicial review will be distinctly Canadian. Distinctly
Canadian means that the Court probably will not engage in an
outright head-to-head confrontation with Parliament or provincial
legislatures. Initially, the Court will likely conduct most of its
substantive review under the guise of procedural review. This
approach has two main advantages. First, it makes it harder for
critics to discern the precise nature of the review. An example of
this difficulty is seen with Calvin's conclusion that Morgentaler had
nothing to do with social review. Second, it casts judicial review in
a language with which the lower courts are more comfortable. The
lower courts would then be eased into conducting more substantive
reviews through this broader procedural review.
A strong possibility exists that in building a distinctive
Canadian approach the language of substantive review will never be
employed. In time, a new phrase for judicial review may emerge
that describes a procedural review and substantive review all combined in one form. This new phrase would have the advantage of
breaking free of all the negative connotations that substantive review
conjures up. The phrase will probably comes as the result of a decision which sets a specific test, such as the Oakes test 62 which is
applied to section 1.
The Supreme Court of Canada will have to establish guiding
principles for interpreting fundamental justice. The form of these
principles will determine the breadth of judicial review under fundamental justice. At the core of these principles will be the Court's
vision of rights. An individual's legal rights in society do not exist
exclusive of the rights of others. Each right of a person has two
components: first, there is the bare or internal right; and second,
62

The test for section 1 was set out in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
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there is the external factor, of the rights and responsibilities of others. In the context of section 7, the Court must define the rights of
life, liberty and security on the basis of the bare right together with
the external factor.
An individual's bare or internal right is a right in its purest
state, before it is intruded upon by others' rights. For instance, a
person has the right to chose a career. Exercising this right, a person
decides to become a doctor. The external factor includes the
impact the rights of others have on the bare right and the
responsibilities and obligations that others owe the bare right. The
external factor shapes the bare right until the final right is
established. Frequently the external right shapes the bare right by
curtailing it through the intrusions of others' rights. The result is the
diminution of the bare right. A person who wants to be a doctor
needs the monetary means. If a person cannot access these means,
because others have exercised their right to accrue wealth, then the
person's bare right of choice to be a doctor is meaningless.
The Court must protect the bare right by taking a more aggressive role. Instead of permitting the rights of others to diminish
a bare right, the Court should impose responsibilities and obligations on the external factor, these outside rightholders, which prevents the reduction of a bare right.
The equality envisioned by the Charter requires the Court to
impose upon the external factor, the Government, the responsibilities and obligations owed to the individual to compensate for the
diminution of her bare right. Thus, the legal rights of life, liberty
and security consist of the individual's bare right and the responsibilities and obligations owed by the Government. Government as
the shaper of society is responsible to correct any harm the individual's bare right has suffered through society's impact or
Government's impact. The person, therefore, who has the bare right
to choose to be a doctor, also has the Government's obligation to
access the monetary means to be a doctor. Thus, the Court sees the
individual's choice in this fuller context.
Fundamental justice in section 7 provides the Court with the
tool to enforce the obligations and responsibilities that the
Government owes an individual's bare right in the shaping of an
individual's legal right. The Court could choose to ignore this
power and in doing so show deference to Government. The cost of
this action would be at the expense of the individual's legal right.
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Conversely, though, the Court may chose to enunciate the obligations of Government and enforce them. If this path is chosen, then an
explosion of full and meaningful rights will occur in the Charter,
and the opportunity to have equality as the state in which all individuals co-exist in Canada will be greatly enhanced.
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APPENDIX I

Overview of Sources of Section 7 Challenges

58.32%

41.68%

Criminal

Civil

Source: Quicklaw Database Charter of Rights Cases:
1982 to 31March1993
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APPENDIX II

Overview of Sections Used in Conjunction
With Section 7 Challenges

Criminal

Civil

Source: Quicklaw Database Charter of Rights Cases:
1982 to 31March1993
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APPENDIX Ill

Jurisdictional Statistics for Section 7 Challenges

Jurisdiction
Newfoundland
Nova Scotia
P.E.I.
New Brunswick
Quebec
Ontario
Manitoba
Saskatchewan
Alberta
B.C.
Yukon
N.W.T.
Federal Courts
t::!otals

LCriminal

I

43
39
12
16
24
131
34
55
39
81
4
9
44
531

I

Civil

I

31
9
17
27
104
42
48
46
76
7
5
70
493

11

Total
54
70
21
33
51
235
76
103
85
157
11

14
114
1024

Source: Quicklaw Database Charter of Rights Cases:
1982 to 31March1993
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APPENDIX

IV

Sections Used in Conjunction With Section 7 Challenges
Civil
Section
2(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
3
4
5
6(1)
6(2)(a)
(b)
(3)
(4)
7
8
9
lO(a)
(b)
(c)
11 (a)
(b)

... T.

I

_J

(c)

(d)
(e)
(f)

IBl

(h)
(i)
12
13
14
15
16
25
26
27
28
To

I

8
24
1
6
0
0
0
0
1
2
0
0
187
62
74
14
53
8
24
42
34
162
13
22
17
20
11
48
19
9
89
1
1
3
4
8
7

0.83
2.48
0.10
0.62
0
0
0
0

0
0
19.34
6.41
7.65
1.45
5.48
0.83
2.48

"'·

3.52
16.75
1.34
2.28
1.76
2.07
1.14
4.96
1.96
0.93
9.20
0.10
0.10
0.31
0.41
0.83

% of total

15
32
5
16
7
4
3
8
9
11
8
6
134
34
16
6
28
4
15
30
22
89
3
4
5
15
2
26
16
6

96
2
1
6
2
5
691

I

2.17
4.63
0.72
2.32
1.01
0.58
0.43
1.16
1.30
1.59
1.16
0.87
19.39
4.92
2.32
0.87
4.05
0.58
2.17
4.34
3.18
12.88
0.43
0.58
0.72
2.17
0.29
3.76
2.32
0.87
13.89
0.29
0.14
0.87
0.29
0.

Source: Quicklaw Database Charter of Rights Cases:
1982 to 31March1993

